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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

"

- - - - - - - - - THE STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 12155

-vs.JESSE£

:1

SCOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
I

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The instant appeal is from a jury verdict rendere<
in

the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,

.)tate of Utah, the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, presiding, finding appellant guilty of robbery in
violation of section 76 -51-1 U. C. A. (1953).
DISPOSITION IN LCWER COURT
Appellant was convicted by jury and sentenced
to the indeterminate term provided by law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment
cif conviction.

'I

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 7, 1969, at approximately 8:00 P.M.,
a Negro male entered the Heber Valley Milk Depot at

Sixth South and Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah,
brandished a revolver, and forced the sole employee
on duty to hand over approximately $120.00 (R. 7,
On November 8, 196 9, appellant was arrested at the

Bonneville Convalescent Nursing Center located at
165 South 10th East, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 111),

and a formal complaint was made on November 10th
charging appellant with the robbery (R. 7).

Trial

was held on April 3, 1970 before the Honorable Aldon
Anderson at which time the jury returned a verdict
of guilty.
Viewing the record of this case in light most
favorable to the State reveals the following evidence.
LeJune Sorenson stated that on her way to visit a
friend, who resides across the street from the scene
of the robbery, she noticed a male Negro who was
limping on his left leg walking directly in front
of her and her little girl (R. 53 -56).

It was

between Eight p. M. and ten to Eight (R. 56) •

The man

turned and proceeded to go on to the porch of Miss
:orenson 1 s friend (R. 55).

While walking towards the

porch she stumbled into a hole in the sidewalk (R. 58) .:

As the two approached the man, he asked them where
the address of 2118 was located.
11

1

Miss Sorenson said,

don't know" and started to go up the stairs (R. 56).

She heard the man mutter something about "is that gas
ptunp busy now?" as she passed him (R. 56).

She and

her daughter went inside the friend's house at which
time she looked out the window.

She saw the man

cross

the street in the direction of the pumps (R. 57).

'

She the!l lost interest and proceeded to watch televisio'
During this encounter with the "man" it was dark except
for a light on the porch of her friend's residence

(R. 61).

After the robbery, the police stopped Miss

Sorenson and her friend walking down the street and
asked them whether they had noticed anything.

After

she described the above facts, the police put her in a
police car until photographs of suspects arrived (R. 59
Miss Sorenson identified the picture of appellant from
the photographs (R. 59).

In court, upon being asked

if the appellant was the man she had encountered that

night, she replied, "He is the same one I seen." (R. 57:

Hiss Sorenson testified that she was sure that appellant
-3 -

was the correct man because,

11

I have modeled and I

never forget a face. TT (R. 65).
Karl Rosenberg testified that on the night of the
incident he was working in the Heber Valley Milk Depot
when a man approached him apparently to pay for a
purchase.

After the register had been opened, the

man pulled a gun and demanded that Mr. Rosenberg
give him all the cash in the drawer (R. 68).

Mr.

Rosenberg testified that the man used his left hand
to assist his right hand in pulling out the gun (R.

He was then ordered to go into the cooler which he
did (R. 70).

Mr. Rosenberg identified the appellant

from pictures shown to him after the robbery (R. 22)
and in a lineup conducted after the robbery (R. 71-72).

The witness related that the robber was wearing a Levi
jacket and solid colored dark pants (R. 77).

Mr.

Rosenberg made an in court identification of the
appellant as the man who had been in the store and
had robbed him (R. 68 ) •
The appellant,Jessie Scott, testified that at
the time of the robbery he had a bandaid on his right

hand from a previous injury but that he was left handed
-4-

and used that hand for all activity anyway (R. 122-123:
The evidence showing that the appellant was
innocent of this charge is overwhelming.

It will be

examined in detail during the course of appellant's
legal argument but a brief summary reveals the
following facts.

Officer Darrell K. Goodrich testified

that no fingerprints were found at the scene of the
robbery (R. 79).

Leray H. Frkovich, a nurse at the

Bonneville Convalescent Home, testified that at the
time of the robbery, appellant was in bed on the second
floor of the Home.

She testified that she was abso-

lutely positive that she had administered medicine
to appellant at approximately 8:00 P.M. (R. 92).
Michael A. McDonald, a rehabilitiation counsellor,
testified at the time appellant was taken to the Home
he was wearing bell-bottomed blue denim Levis and
an avocado greenish turtle-neck sweater (R. 98).

H no time did Mr. McDonald see any other clothing
in the possession of appellant (R. 99).

Reuel McPhie,

administrator of the Bonneville Convalescent Center,
testified that a rigid security procedure is employed
at the Center which makes it very difficult if not
impossible for a patient to leave or enter the premises

after 8:00 P.M. (R. 104).

Furthermore, he testified

that as a matter of routine, much of the medicine is
administered at 8:00 P.M. after the visitors have
departed (R. 110).

Officer John Peck, the arresting

officer, testified that no jacket, gun, or money was
found in appellant's possession (R. 112).

He testified

that through error the pictures of the lineup in which
appellant had been identified were "mis placed.'' (R. 114
He further testified that the police did not attempt
to find how appellant traveled the approximate three
mile round trip from the Home to the robbery site and
back to the Home (R. 115).

Finally, appellant

testified that he had voluntarily entered the Home
to "kick a narcotic habit." (R. 119).

He testified

that he had been in his room during the whole night
md that several nurses had entered periodically
:hroughout the evening to administer medicine or see
:o his comfort

(R. 72).

He denied the commission of

:he robbery (R. 122), and explained that his right
.rm was not injured at the time the robbery occurred

R. 123).

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE APPELLANT AS THE
PERPETRATOR OF THE ROBBERY THEREBY PRECLUDING
REASONABLE MINDS FROM FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
This Court has established the rule which must
bP followed if a jury verdict is to be disturbed on

appeal.
[I]t must appear that, viewing the evidence
and all fair inferences reasonably to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the jury 1 s verdict, reasonable minds could
not believe them [defendants] guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, but would necessarily
entertain some substantial doubt of their
guilt• TT
1
T

[I]t is not sufficient merely that reasonable
minds may have entertained such doubts. Before
a verdict may properly be set aside, it must
appear that the evidence was so inconclusive
or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting
fairly upon it must have entertained reasonable
doubt that defendants committed the crime.
Unless the evidence compels such conclusion
as a matter of law, the verdict must stand. Tr
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212,
214-15 (1957).

It is appellant 1 s contention that the circumstance
of this case justify a reversal of the lower court's

1Jerdict.

Although there is some evidence tending to

support the guilt of appellant, this evidence is so
weak and insubstantial that it cannot overcome the
presumption of appellantts innocence nor support a
verdict of guilty

TT

beyond a reasonable doubt. TT

Each element of an offense must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt before the jury may properly

convict.

State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 71, 355 P.2d

57 (1960).
TT The burden of proof on the
prosecution
extends to every element of the crime
charged, including the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt the identity
of the defendant as the perpetrator of
the crime for which he stands charged. TT
U.S. v. Barber, 9 Crim. L. Rptr. 2150,
April 4, 1971 (3rd. Cir.).

This Court has often expressed its view that
these fundamental concepts must always be preserved.
The presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof of guilt beyond any
reasonable doubt, are indeed of the utmost
importance as safeguards against the
possibility of convicting the innocent.
We scrupulously adhere to them notwithstanding the difficulties encountered
and the possibility that some guilty may
escape punishment. It is an ancient and
honored adage of our law that it is better
that ten guilty go free than that one
innocent person be punished. State v.
Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212,
215 (1975); Cf. State v. George, No. 12135
Filed Feb. 22, 1971 (Utah).

Tn the instant case the appellant has been
convicted solely on the testimony of the two state
v1itnesses.

There was absolutely no other evidence

which supported the appellant's guilt.

Thus, this

case presents the converse of those cases in which
circumstantial evidence is the only form of evidence
supporting a conviction.

This Court has recognized

the dangers which are inherent when only circumstantial
evidence is present.
"[W]here a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the evidence should be
looked upon with caution, and that it must
exclude every reasonable hypothesis except
the guilt of defendant. This is entirely
logical, because if the jury believes that
there is a reasonable hypothesis in the
evidence consistent with the defendant's
innocence, there would naturally be a
reasonably doubt as to his guilt. TT
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d
246; 24 7 (1970).
Appellant submits that the Court should be equally
cautious when the only evidence present is that of
eyewitness testimony.

While it is assumed by many

that this type of evidence is the most reliable,
it in fact may be the very least reliable.

Appellant

vlill show that the witnesses in this case were

completely unreliable for identification purposes
-9-

because of various factors surrounding the circumstance

of their contact with the person committing the
robbery.

The appellant contends that the overwhelming

weight of the evidence does not justify a verdict of
guilty.
In a recent case of some import, the United States
Supreme Court made the following observation:
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said:
'What is the worth of identification
testimony even when uncontradicted? The
identification of strangers is proverbially
untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number
of instances in the records of English and
American trials. These instances are
recent--not due to the brutalities of ancient
criminal procedure. 1 The Case of Sacco and
Vanzetti 30 (1927). A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage
of justice from mistaken identification has
been the degree of suggestion inherent in
the manner in which the prosecution presents
the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification. A commentator has observed that
'[t]he influence of improper suggestion upon
identifying witnesses probably accounts for
more miscarriages of justice than any other
single factor--perhaps it is responsible for
more such errors than all other factors
combined. 1 Wall, Eye-Witness Identification
in Criminal Cases 26. Suggestion can be
created intentionally or unintentionally in
many subtle ways. And the dangers for the
suspect are particularly grave when the
witness' opportunity for observation was
insubstantial, and thus his susceptibility
to suggestion the greatest. U.S. v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1967).
-10-

I

!.

Many corrunentators and courts have expressed
their view that eye witness testimony must be carefull}
scrutinized.

A corrunittee formed to investigate the

case of Adolf Beck who had served seven years in
prison for a crime he did not corrunit noted that
"evidence as to identity based on personal impressions,
however bona fide is perhaps of all classes of evidence
the least to be relied upon, and therefore, unless
supported by other facts, an unsafe basis for the
verdict of a jury. TT
250 (1924).

Watson, The Trial of Adolf Beck

A present day prosecutor has remarked

that:
TT Proof that relies wholly on identification
made by eye-witnesses inherently weak;
persons who merely saw a thief or attacker
briefly, and under conditions of stress,
may--despite the best of intentions--too
readily be mistaken.TT Kuh, Careers in
Prosecution Offices, 14 J. Legal Ed. 175,

187 n.21 (1961).

Finally, Earl Stanley Gardner, a famous novelist
criminal trial lawyer remarked,
Any veteran attorney knows that circumstantial evidence is about the best
evidence there is and that eyewitness
identification evidence is just about
the worst.TT Gardner, The Need for New
Concepts in the Administration of
Criminal Justice. 50 J. Crl1Tl. L. 20,
11

26

(1959).

Basically there are two causes of erroneous

identification:

(1) the normal and universal falli-

bilities of hIBnan sense perception and hIBnan memory,
and (2) the susceptibility of the hIBnan

suggestive influence.

mind to

Wall, Eye-Witness Identification

in Criminal Cases 9 (1965) [Hereinafter cited Wall].
As is beauty, identification is in the eye of the
beholder.

TTA

surprisingly large nIBnber of people

who are not color blind, who do not need an oculist,

1

and who are supposed to have normal vision, in fact

1

'

I do not have it.

They cannot recognize likenesses or

differences, nor distinguish variations in form, size,
and position as can persons who are normal in that

respect. TT

McCarty, Psychology and the Law 186 (1960).

Sven those people with perfect eyesight can be
deceived by illusions created by the brain to make
i an nintelligible image. TT
1

Take, for example, the

following two figures :
Figure A

>
,/
,,,-----""

Figure B

Anyone looking at Figure A would say that the line
in the first illustration is longer than that of the
second.

Similarly, the vertical line of Figure B

appears longer than the horizontal line.

In fact,

however, both lines in both figures are identical in
length.
"Illusions are caused by the distortion
that man's reasoning process introduces
into a situation. Although a phenomenon
is perceived clearly, man makes a mistake
in jud91nent when he interprets that phenomenon. This judgment is not a conscious
evaluation; rather, it is caused by the
manner in which man's nervous system is
structured. In certain circumstances
a misleading stimulus causes the mind
to be deceived." Rokes, "Psychological
Factors Governing the Credibility of
Witnesses,'' 1968 Ins. L.J. 155 (March).
n,n

eye-witness may make a similar deceptive evaluation

in the observation of an event or person if the

"misleading" stimuli are present.
It has been repeatedly shown that people are

poor observers.

In many tests involving college

students, police trainees, highly trained forestry
observers, and average citizens it has been shown
that wide variation will occur in the observation
retention, and explanation of a given event.

For

'

example, estimates made by a group of college girls
as to the height of two young men who had, without

notice, enacted a

11

crime" in their presence ranged

from four feet eight inches to seven feet for one
of the men and from four feet to six feet fuur inches

for the other.

Vickery & Brooks, Time Spaced

Reporting of a "Crime" Witnessed by College Girls,
29 J. Crim. L. 371, 373 (1938).
:Perception, Memory, and Hearsay:

1

See also, Stewart,
A Criticism of

Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,'
1970 Utah L. Rev. 1;8-22.
While being poor observers many people are also
extremely subject to suggestion so that it is often
hfficult to tell whether they actually observed the
or person they are describing or whether external
ir internal suggestions have made them think they saw

hat they are describing.

1

-14-

The Supreme Court recognized

that external suggestions by police in a pretrial
identification have inherent dangers which must be
protected against.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 21!

(1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
In addition, internal suggestions made in the person's
mind may also distort the actual occurrence.
It must always be borne in mind how
extremely prone persons are to believe
what they wish. It is a matter of
frequent observation that persons
dwelling for a long time on facts which
they believe must have occurred, and
trying to remember whether they did so
or not, come at last to persuade themselves that they actually recollect the
occurrences of circumstances which at
first they only begin by believing must
have happened. What was the result of
imagination becomes in time the result
of recollection. Without imputing
anything like willful and corrupt perjury
to witnesses of this description, they
often in truth bona fide believe that
they have heard and remembered conversations and observations which in truth
never existed, but are the mere offspring
of their imaginations. Quotation from
Sir John Romilly in Rokes, ''Psychological
Factors Governing the Credibility of
Witnesses," 1968 Ins. L.J. 150, 151.
Thus, many eye-witnesses cannot physically
perceive the described event or person, cannot
accurately recall what was observed, and may "see"
things which were actually not present because of
later suggestion.

The significance of these

',ieak.nesses in eye -witness testimony is extremely

......_

,=

important.

It soon becomes apparent that eyewitness

testimony should be cautiously viewed as convicting
evidence.

The fact, for example, that a number of

witnesses concur in the identification of a suspect
is no guarantee that the identification is correct.
The mere fact that three or four witnesses identify a suspect provides no
assurance that they are correct, especially
when all have been subjected to a suggestive
identification procedure. Indeed, on a
number of occasions, even larger numbers of
identifying witnesses have erred. In a
trial in Massachusetts in 1845, the defendant
proved his innocence conclusively and in so
doing demonstrated that the twelve witnesses
who had identified him were all mistaken, "a
fact, as the judge well remarked, almost
sufficient to shake all confidence in human
testimony." Cases involving erroneous identification by thirteen, fourteen, and seventeen
witnesses have been reported, but they are
by no means the most extreme examples. An
English conviction for obtaining property
by false pretenses was once quashed on the
basis of newly discovered evidence which
proved that twenty-one identifying witnesses
had been mistaken. The ill-fated Adolf Beck
was identified by twenty-two witnesses, all
tragically in error. At about the same time
that Beck was undergoing his ordeal in England,
another defendant, this one in Chicago, was
placed on trial for a number of forgeries,
all of which had obviously been committed
by the same person, and was identified by
thirty witnesses. More fortunate than Beck,
he gained an acquittal by proving that he had
been in jail at the time when at least one
of the crimes had been committed.
Wall at 11-12 (citations omitted).
-16-

The fact that a witness seems extremely certain
of his identification is of little assurance that

the identification is correct.

During a prosecution for robbery in
Philadelphia in 1919, a policeman testified that a witness who had positively
identified the defendant at the trial
had previously viewed a lineup which
included the policeman and had pointed
at the policeman, saying, 11 That' s the
man. I'll always remember to my dying
day the faces of the guys who pulled
guns on me. 11 In the trial of Adolf
Beck, a witness from who Beck was alleged
to have taken some property identified
him quite positively, saying, TTI should
know him among a thousand. I recognized
him at once; I am quite sure he is the
man." In that same trial, another
witness identified Beck, and added:
11
I have not a shadow of a doubt he is the
man.TT These three incidents illustrate
a point well worth noting, and that is
that the mere fact that a witness uses
positive or even absolute terms is no
indication that his identification is any
more reliable than the normal identification.
Indeed, as Borcharo has said, 11 the positiveness of witnesses is sometimes • . . in
inverse ratio to their opportunity for
knowledge or to their reliability."
Behind this view lie two explanations,
one psychological and the other practical.
Psychologically, the individual who is
careless in his observations and weak in
memory may often be the type of person who
makes snap judgments and in whom such
qualities as 11 pride and stubbornness, make
for confirmation of the original identification rather than for open-minded reconsideration. 11 And as a practical matter,
even if a witness's original identification
is uncertain or hesitant, he may be subjected

to so many suggestive influences by the
police that at the trial he will make a
"positive identification which no amount
of subsequent cross-examination will be
able to shake . 11 Despite the fact that
the identification is positive, even
dramatically so, it may nevertheless be
completely erroneous. Wall at 15-16
(citations omitted).
Finally, it should be noted that juries will
often unduly place great weight on an identification
made by an eyewitness.

The fact that such identifi-

cation may be completely erroneous has little effect
on an average juror unless the defendant is lucky
enough to have an ironclad alibi.

It is for this

reason that an appellant must overseer the jury
'1

verdict to insure that there was sufficient reason
to believe the guilt of the defendant even if the

eyewitness testimony is diluted in persuasiveness.
Although the following commentary is rather lengthy,
it

illustrates this problem much more vividly than

would paraphrasing.
More than fifty years ago, Hans Gross,
a great German jurist, made the following
observation: "Once a man who claimed, in
spite of absolute darkness, to have recognized an opponent who punched him in the
eye was altogether believed, simply because
' assumed that the punch was so vigorous
.
it was
that the wounded man saw sparks by the light
of which he could recognize the other . • • .
-18-

[T]hat such things were believed is a
notable warning."
Although such beliefs would obviously
never be entertained in civilized society
today, the example cited makes a point
worth noting, for it refers to one of the
principal causes of convictions based upon
erroneous identification--the fact that,
in general, juries are unduly receptive to
identification evidence and are not sufficiently aware of its dangers. It has been
said that "positive recognition by well
intended uninterested persons is commonly
accepted unless the alibi is convincing,"
and that evidence of identification, however
untrustworthy, is "taken by the average
juryman as absolute proof." It is precisely
this absence of a healthy skepticism on the
party of jurors toward eye-witness identification which is the factor most seriously
aggravating an already serious problem, for
it permits incorrect accusations to ripen into
unjust convictions. And the danger is even
more acute when the person identified has
a criminal record, for "it is not improper
to infer that such a person charged with a
cr::Une!las, in practical effect, to bear the
burden of proving himself innocent."
It is not always easy to determine, in a
particular case, whether a convicting jury
actually relied upon untrustworthy evidence
of identification. There may have been other
evidence which formed the real basis for the
verdict, the identification evidence having
quite properly been rejected. Even here,
however, the fact that the evidence was
presented demonstrates that at least the
prosecution set some store by it • . •
In the Sacco-Vanzetti case, the prosecutor
introduced some completely incredible identification testimony. One witness, Mary Splaine,
based her identification of Sacco upon impressions she formed while watching the
-19-

criminals who were riding in a car which
passed no closer to her than sixty or
eighty feet, and which she had in view
only for the period of time which it took
the car to travel fifty or sixty feet.
Despite the fact that observing a person
in a passing automobile presents TT one of
the least reliable, if not worthless,
opportunities for idm tification," her
testimony implicating Sacco was positive
and most detailed, as the following excerpt
will indicate.
Q. Can you describe him to these gentlemen
here?
A. Yes, sir. He was a man that I should
say was slightly taller than I am. He
weighed possibly from 140 to 145 pounds.
He was a muscular,--he was an active
looking man. I noticed particularly
the left hand was a good sized hand,
a hand that denoted strength or a
shoulder that-Q. So that the hand you said you saw
where?
A. The left hand, that was placed • . .
on the back of the front seat. He
had a gray, what I thought was a
shirt,--had a grayish, like navy color,
and the face was what we would call
clear-cut, clean-cut face. Through
here [indicating] was a little narrow,
just a little narrow. The forehead
was high. The hair was brushed back
and it was between, I should think,
two inches and two and one-half inches
in length and had dark eyebrows, but the
complexion was a white, peculiar white
that looked greenish.
In commenting upon this testimony, which was
by no means unique in the case, a psychologist
wrote that, "Such perception and memory under
such conditions can be easily proved to be
-20-

psychologically impossible. Every psychologist
knows that--so does Houdini. And what shall
we think of the animus and honesty of the
state that introduces such testimony to
convict, knowing that the jury is too ignorant
to disbelieve?" His view makes good sense.
Our question here, however, is whether the
jury actually relied upon such testimony in
arriving at its verdict. A poll of six of
the jurors, taken in 1950, indicates that
at least two of them were greatly impressed
with it.
There are other cases • • . in which it
seems clear that the jury based its verdict
of guilt either upon incredible identification
evidence or upon identification evidence which
was far outweighed by evidence of innocence.
Juries have believed eight witnesses who
identified a defendant rather than thirty-one
who swore he was not the guilty party. They
have believed nine identifying witnesses,
many of whom admitted they could be mistaken,
rather than more than forty completely respectable and disinterested alibi witnesses.
They have believed a woman who identified
the defendant as the man who raped her, even
though she admitted that the person she
immediately thereafter persuaded to stay
with her until her husband returned from
work was that same defendant. (State v.
Thomas, 188 N.W. 689 (Iowa, 1922)) . . . •
No discussion of the danger which a defendant
may face when placed on trial before a jury
too ready to accept identification evidence
is complete without an examination of the
travail of Harry Cashin. On February 19,
1931, a speakeasy in New York City was held
up by two men. During the robbery, two
policemen entered, and there ensued a gun
battle in which one robber and one policeman
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were killed, and the other robber probably
wounded before making his escape. The dead
banditTs identity was quickly discovered
and an investigation was immediately begun
concerning his friends and acquaintances.
One of his former employees, nineteen-yearold Harry Cashin, was picked up for questioning three hours after the crime and
was taken to a police station so that he
might be able to give the police a clue
to the identity of his former employerTs
accomplice. Every witness to the robbery
was in the station house when Cashin arrived,
but not a single one identified him. Almost
two months later, he was arrested for the
murder on the basis of an identification by
one of the witnesses, a prostitute, and
was eventually placed on trial for his life.
At the trial, the only evidence of guilt
was his identification by the prostitute.
The points in favor of his innocence were
as follows:
(1) the identifying witness
had previously sworn that she could not
identify him; (2) all other witnesses had
refused to identify him; (3) he did not
resemble the description of the robber
originally given by the witnesses; (4)
although the robber was probably wounded
making his escape, Cashin was without injury
three hours after the crime; (S) a cab
driver who had driven two men to the
speakeasy at about the time of the crime,
one of whom he identified as the dead
bandit, swore that Cashin was not the
other; (6) he had no previous criminal
record; (7) he had an alibi supported by
his fiancee and her aunt. Having heard
all the evidence, the jury deliberated,
applied the test of reasonable doubt, and
found Harry Cashin guilty of murder in the
first degree. The conviction was reversed
in the interest of justice. People v.
Cashin, 259 N.Y. 434, 182 N.E. 74 (1932).
-22-

If ever a case existed which demonstrated
how perilous is the position of a person
identified as the perpetrator of a cr:ime,
surely this is it. Wall at 19-23
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The preceding discussion illustrates the
dangers which may be found in eye-witness
identification.

Keeping these dangers in mind

appellant will now examine the eye witness identification in the instant case.

As previously mentioned

the state relied exclusively on the identification
of appellant by LeJune Sorenson and Karl Rosenberg.
The circumstances surrounding the encounter of both
of these witnesses with the robber make their
I

identification extremely tenuous.
Miss Sorenson began her walk to her friend's
house at about quarter to eight (R. 53).

Of course,

at that time of year there would be absolutely no
illwnination from the sun making it necessary for
Miss Sorenson to rely principally on artificial
lighting.

The prosecution failed to introduce

any evidence of moonlight during that evening.
1

When she first saw the "robber" it was from the
back.

"Q.

And did you have an occasion to see

a colored man that night?
-23-

A.

After I crossed

':tate and was --I got almost to First East and
then I was walking behind him quite a distance. 11
(R. 54).

She did not see his face during this

walk and only noticed his limp. (R. 55, lns. 15-27).
Miss Sorenson testified that she had an opportunity
to observe the man for

11

about four or five minutes"

after he had gone onto the steps of her friend's
house (R. 7, ln. 30).

But as appellant's counsel

probed for more information it should have become
obvious to the jury that the actual encounter was
for a very short period of time.

The man turned

into the yard of Miss Sorenson's friend and proceeded
to go onto the porch (R. 55, lns 26-30).

Of course,

he still would have his back turned until he reached
the proch where he evidently turned around.

It is

unclear exactly what happened thereafter because
, Miss Sorenson does not clearly relate the time
sequence of events.

However, it would seem that

she and her daughter were walking in direction of
the porch when she fell into a

11

hole 11 in the sidewalk

(R. 55 ln. 30) [or in the stairway(?) R. 60, ln.
'.14-25].

She testified that she

11

picked myself up

and he asked me where 2118 was and he was looking
-24-

straight at me right in the face" (R. 61, lns 26-28).
This is in contrast to her testimony that he asked
her about the address before she fell, ''When I
first was approaching up the cement stairs before

1

I

fell he asked where 2118 was and I said I didn't

know this was 218." (R. 62, lns.19-21).

According

to her testimony the man was still on the porch
when she fell into the hole which evidently meant
that there was quite some distance between them

(R. 61, lns. 20-25).

She testified that the

stumbling into the hole took about three minutes

(R. 58, lns. 8-10) even though she didn't fall.
It would seem incredible that even the most
! awkward person could spend this amount of time
in a "stumble".

The conversation regarding the

house number could not have lasted more than a
few seconds.

Evidently, the suspect then descended

the stairs as she was ascending them and while they
Passed he muttered something like "is that gas
Pumps busy now." (R. 56, ln. 24).

She then walked

into the house (R. 56, ln. 28), where she looked
out the window and watched him cross the street
in the direction of the Milk Depot.
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Reconstructing

this witness's testimony reveals the following
situation.
cl

Miss Sorenson and her daughter followed

man from the back for some distance only noticing

his limp.

He turned into the yard of her friend

and walked up to the porch of the house where the
light was located.

She and her daughter proceeded

to walk towards the porch at which time he either
asked her about the address from the porch or asked
her about the address after she had stumbled into
the hole.

At that moment the witness was probably

some distance from the porch looking towards the man w:
his back facing the light.

She obviously was somewhat

flustered from falling into the hole and was concerned
that her little girl wouldn't also get hurt (R. 58,
lns. 8-10; R. 61, lns. 21-28).

This obviously would

have diverted her attention from the suspect.

She

then continued to walk up the path towards her
friend's door at which time she passed him coming
down at which time he said something about the gas
pumps.

She then went inside and watched him from

the back as he crossed the street.

Thus, the only

close confrontation between the witness and the
-26-

suspect occurred as they were passing on the porch
and which could have lasted for only a few seconds.
The remainder of the time she could either not see
his face or was at some distance from him with the
lighting illuminating his back.

Thus the jury

could not reasonably believe her statement, "Q.
Miss Sorenson, how long did you have an opportunity
to look at the man on the stairs? A. Oh, about four
or five minutes because he was asking me an address
and I was pointing east."

The actual time of clear

observation, if any, was probably under 30 seconds.
It should also be noted that except possibly
for the time when the suspect stood on her friend's
porch Miss Sorenson had no particular reason to
observe him.

Even after that there was nothing

extremely unusual for a person to be at the wrong
address.

For this reason Miss Sorenson really

had no reason to observe the man very carefully
even if she had had a better opportunity.
The usual identification witness is one
who makes his observation of the guilty
party at a time when he knows that a
crime is taking place, that the person
under observation is the perpetrator,
-27-

and that an identification of that person
may soon be required. Whatever may be
his shortcomings as an observer, he surely
has a strong motive to observe the guilty
party as carefully as he can and to make
mental notes of whatever distinguishing
physical characteristics he may be able
to observe. Of course, the stress of the
moment often prevents him from doing this,
but he at least has the motive to do so.
Where the witness is not aware that he
is involved in a crime situation, however,
no such motive exists and there, in most
cases, no such careful observation. other
factors being equal, an identification by
the latter type of witness is far less
reliable than an identification by the
former type. This distinction is a very
important one, although it is not often
commented upon. Wall, at 126. See also,
People v. Crum, 272 N.Y. 348, 356, 6 N.E.2d
51, 54 (1936).
Miss Sorenson admitted that she doesntt go out of
her way to observe people.

"I don T t pay any

attention to nothing unless it is right there and
it stops me.
28-29).

I mind my own business." (R. 60, lns.

She also was unable to remember what the

suspect was wearing during her
'

Q.

1

11

prolonged" observation.

What was the man wearing at that time?

don't remember now.

I

dontt.

Q.

A. I

You cantt recall

anything at all about what he was wearing?

A. No."

Miss.Sorenson identified appellant from photographs
shown to her by police officers after the robbery

had been corrmi tted.

She identified appellant on

three different occasions from his photograph
but never saw him personally until trial.
The use of photographs is clearly inferior
to corporeal identification since it puts the
suspect in a frozen image which is often very
different from the real guise of the person
suspected.
In considering the effect which the
use of photographs may have upon the
reliability of an identification, there
are a number of principles which must be
recognized, and the first is that where
a photograph has been identified as that
of the guilty party, any subsequent
corporeal identification of that person
may be based not upon the witness's
recollection of the features of the
guilty party, but upon his recollection
of the photograph. Thus, although a
witness who is asked to attempt a
corporeal identification of a person
whose photograph he has previously
identified may say, "That's the man that
did it," what he may actually mean is
11
That' s the man whose photograph I
identified. 11 Sir Richard Muir, one of
the greatest English prosecutors of
modern times, was always concerned
about the reliability of such identifications, believing that "however
honest a witness might be, he could
not shut out from his mind the features
of the man he had seen in the photograph."
The witness's inability to do so is not
at all surprising, since the corporeal
identification is always closer (and
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often much closer) in time to the photographic identification than it is to the
crime, and since the witness usually
studies the photographs far more carefully
and for a longer period of time than he
was able to study the features of the
perpetrator of the crime. Wall at 68.
Miss Sorenson first saw the pictures in a police
car

which "was kind of dark but then they turned

on the light and let me see it and it was the man
right there."

(R. 14, lns. 6 -8 ) .

There is , of

course, no way of telling how fairly the initial
viewing of the pictures was conducted although
Officer Peet testified that only colored males
around appellant's age were shown (R. 117-118).
Whether any special attention was given to
appellant's picture because of his limp will never
be known.

Appellant contends, however, that when

a witness is shown pictures of a suspect free from
adversary supervision and then is repeatedly shown
the same picture for a period of 6 months, there
is a very good likelihood that the witness is
testifying from the observation of the picture
and not from the observation of the suspect.

The

police practice in this case to show the witness
the same picture repeatedly and not to schedule
a lineup which she could attend should create

'.":.uspicion.

Even though Miss Sorenson was quite

adamant that she was identifying appellant from
the encounter and not the picture, this is not to
say that photographic identification was not the
exclusive source.

As mentioned supra the human mind

can be very suggestible both externally and internally
so that a person will actually believe something
which did not occur.
Thus, a reasonable doubt must exist in the
minds of reasonable men as to appellant's guilt
concerning the testimony of Miss Sorenson when the
limited opportunity for observation is considered,
the light conditions which then existed, the
nnormality" of the situation which gave no reason
for studious observation, the repeated showing
of appellant's picture without a corporeal identification, and the length of time which had elapsed
between the brief encounter and the trial.
The testimony given by Karl Rosenberg, victim
of the robbery, is equally unreliable.
of observation was very short.

The time

"Q. So, in fact,

rather than having observed the defendant for two
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or three minutes you only saw him for approximately
forty seconds, is that not correct?
Time is -- Q.
was it not?

A.

Possibly.

It was very rapid sequence of events,
A. Yes." (R. 74, lns. 10-15).

Even

this opportunity was diminished by the fact that a
portion of the time was used in observation of the
gun.

"Q.

So at least some of the time you spent

during this forty second period until you were
near the cooler was spent in looking at the gun?
A. Yes."

(R. 75, lns. 6-9).

Thus, Mr. Rosenberg

probably had less than half a minute to observe
the features of the robber.

It should also be

noted that the witness at the time of observation
was undergoing a tremendous nervous reaction since
a

loaded gun was being pointed at him with threats

of violence if he failed to obey the gurunan.

Such

a situation may very well impair the ability of
a witness to make accurate observations.

A person who is the victim of or witness
to a crime of violence such as assault or
robbery is almost always in a state of
fear and agitation during the commission
of the crime. In so far as his ability
to make a later identification is concerned,
the effect of such emotions upon the person
who experiences them is a matter of some
-32-

debate. One school of thought holds
that fear improves the ability to make
accurate observations; another holds
that it impedes such an ability.

....

The obvious answer to the question
posed here is that ttfear has a very
different effect upon different person;
in some it prevents the clear perception,
whilst in others it assists in making
an indelible impression." 2 Moore, A
Treatise on Facts § 1228 (1908). But
this answer, true as it is, does not
solve the problem, for there remains
another question as important as the
first: how is the jury to determine
which of the two types of person the
identifying witness really is? Wall at
16-17.
Therefore, the prosecution produced one witness
who had little reason to observe the suspect and
another witness whose ability for such observation
was possibly greatly impaired by anxiety and
nervousness.
After the robbery the police showed Mr.
Rosenberg "about two dozen" photographs of possible
suspects (R. 71, ln. 19).

Mr. Rosenberg testified

that he identified appellant from these pictures
(R.

71, lns. 20-24).

Again, as in the case of

Miss Sorenson, it is impossible to say whether
1ny undue suggestive influence was applied to
-33-

Mr. Rosenberg at the time of identification since
only the witness and the police officers were
present.

However, even presuming that no influence

was exerted a danger still existed:

the witnessTs

identification of the appellantTs photograph was
reinforced, not by repeated showings as in the case
of Miss Sorenson, but by a prejudicial lineup
which made appellant stand out because of insufficient number of participants, differing age, and
physical stature.

(R. 71-72).

This fact was not

possible to bring out fully because the picture of
the lineup which is always taken was "misplaced".
(R. 114, ln. 11).

The importance of such a

picture can be seen by noting the requirements
of a valid lineup.
The canposition of the line-up--how
many persons are in it, what they look
like, what they wear, who they are--is
a matter of great importance, for unless
it is completely free from suggestive
influences, its value will be greatly
diminished, if not destroyed.

.

...

Assuming that a sufficient number of
persons are available to form a proper
line-up (at least five or six, and more
if possible), the next question concerns
the physical characteristics of those
-34-

persons. Obviously, they should be
approximately the same as those of the
suspect. If they are not, if the
line-up is so composed as to suggest
to the witness that the suspect is
"the man to be identified," then any
identification may be considered to
have little probative value. Indeed
a line-up may be constructed so as t;
be "little more than a farce," by
provoking TT identification through
accentuation," and it may do this
in a number of ways • . • • [A] blackhaired suspect was placed among a
group of light-haired persons, tall
suspects have been made to stand with
short non-suspects, and, in a case
where the perpetrator of the crime
was known to be a youth, a suspect
under twenty was placed in a line-up
with five other persons, all of whom
were forty or over. Wall at 53
(citations omitted).
The lineup, as shown by both affirmative and
negative evidence of the record, would do little
more than impress appellant's image into Mr.
Rosenberg's mind after the initial photographic
identification had been made.

For this reason,

his testimony concerning appellant's identification
is completely unreliable.

This is further borne

out by the fact that Mr. Rosenberg was unable
to remember anything about the other participants
in the lineup or about appellant's appearance in
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spite of extended opportunity for observation
(R. 72).

If he was unable to remember even the

slightest thing about three other persons who he
had ample opportunity to observe, it seems extra' ordinary that he could be so certain as to the
suspect's identity considering the short time for
observation and the anxiety he was experiencing.
i

For these reasons appellant contends that Mr.
Rosenberg's testimony was insufficient for the
jury to base a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
One last point should be mentioned concerning
the testimony of both prosecution witnesses.

Both

witnesses were Caucasians who were attempting to
identify a Negro suspect.

This fact alone makes

these identifications even more suspect.
Another important factor to be considered in assessing the reliability
of an identification is whether the
witness and the person identified
are of the same or different races.
In general, there is a much greater
possibility of error where the races
are different than where they are
the same. Where they are different,
there is more likelihood of error
where the suspect belongs to a minority
group and the witness to a majority
-36-

group than there is in the opposite
situation. Almost fifty years ago
. was said to be: "well known that,
'
it
other things being equal, individuals
of a given race are distinguishable
from each other in proportion to our
familiarity, to our contact with the
race as a whole. Thus to the uninitiated American, all Asiatics look
alike, while to the Asiatic all white
men look alike." Almost as long ago,
reference was made to Tithe fatal
resemblance which negroes often have
to one another in the eyes of white
men." And a French legal writer has
stated that "resemblance is a matter
of relativity. For a white person,
all negroes are like each other, and
conversely. Indeed, when a white
person has identified a Negro, astute
defense counsel have, with psychological
validity, asked the jury to test the
reliability of the identification in
light of the fact that the defendant
is a member of a race with which the
witness has had little contact. Wall
at 122 (citations omitted).
Although it is not possible to say that the
witness's identification of a Negro must necessarily
be

inaccurate, it certainly is another factor which,

when added to the unreliable factors already existing,
make it impossible for a reasonable man to find
appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Without the testimony of the state's two
witnesses there could have been no conviction.
In many ways this case is similar to the evidentially
problem presented in State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d
162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964).

Although the problem

in that case centered around the validity of a
possible co-conspirator to the crime, a similarity
exists because in both cases the testimony of the
state's witnesses adversely determined that a
nreasonable doubt" did not exist.

Former Chief

Justice Henriod stated this difficulty in his
dissent:
I hesitate in sharing the jury's
verdict that the evidence pointed to
the result it reached beyond any
reasonable doubt, and this hesitation
is impelled by the quantum and quality
of some of the evidence adduced, a lot
of which seemed to have been of an
unsavory complexion. Because of this
hesitancy I feel constrained to think
that in resolving doubts in favor of
an accused, as we must, this case
merits another hearing, hence I dissent.
In so doing, I would point out only a
portion of the voluminous testimony
adduced, as illustrative of the quality
of the evidence, or lack of it, of such
unusual atmosphere as to have created
in my mind the hesitation of which I
speak.
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I am of the opinion that without the
testimony of the StateTs TTstarTT witness,
there would have been insufficient
evidence to justify a conviction beyond
all reasonable doubt. If this witnessT
testimony were expunged, I think this
court could not affirm the verdict, and
so far as I am concerned, the fantasy
indulged by the witness leads me to
believe his entire testimony should have
been the subject of disbelief, except
that which attested to his name, rank
and serial number--the last of which
was his number as an exconvict. 389
P.2d at 471 (dissent).
While the witness in the Sinclair case was perhaps
unreliable because of criminal motives, the same
reason concerning unreliability as stated above
is equally applicable to an eyewitness whose
identification testimony is also unreliable.
Appellant could not have been convicted of this
crime unless the jury believed the testimony of
the two state witnesses to be reliable - a fact
which can be more readily seen when the evidence
weighing in favor of appellant is examined.
Leray Frkovich, a practical nurse now working
at Holy Cross Hospital, testified that on the night
the robbery was committed appellant was in his room
at the Bonneville Convalescent Nursing Home where
-39-

she was then employed.

She stated that the room

appellant had been given was on the second story
of the structure (R. 81), that a screen removable
only from the outside was attached to appellantts
window and it had not been disturbed (R. 83), that
she had given him medicine at 8:00 P.M. (R. 83,
lns. 2-4); that she was stationed right across
from his room where she could see his door and yet
did not see him leave or enter (R. 90, lns. 4-15),
and that no one else on the floor indicated to her
that they had seen appellant outside of his room

(R. 84).

Despite a strong attack by the prosecution

Mrs. Frkovich remained adamant that she had given
appellant medicine at 8:00 P.M. the evening of the
robbery--a fact which would make it physically
impossible for appellant to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.

A

typical dialogue showing this sureness is illustrated
by

the following testimony:

Q. And your testimony is to going in
exactly at 8:00 o'clock? (sic) There is no
question in your mind?

.....

A.

Thatts right.

Q.

A couple minutes either
- 0-

A.

That's right.

Q.

No question in your mind about that?

A.

No.

Q. You went in and gave him the medicine
that night? It is not possible he snuck out?
You were about fifteen minutes or a half hour
late with the medicine that night?
A.

No.

Q. It is not possible you gave him the
medicine at about earlier (sic) than that
and then just marked down 8:00 o'clock? (sic).
A. No, sir, unless, it was about two
minutes to. No, sir, we have specific orders
for this fellow at that time. (R. 91, lns. 8-23).
The prosecution inferred throughout the
testimony that Mrs. Frkovich often marked down the
wrong times when she gave medicine in an attempt
to discredit her.

Witness the following example:

Q.

Who is your immediate supervisor, Ma'am?

A.

Mrs. Hunt, Oral Hunt and Reuel McPhie.

Q. And you work directly under Mrs. Hunt
don't you?
A.

That's right, sir.

Q. And didn't on many occasions she complain
to you about the way you were giving medicine
to patients?
A. No, sir, she never complained to me in
her life?
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r

r

Q. And she has never complained to you
then about the times that you claim you give
the medicine and the time you write down?
A. No, sir, she never had no occasion.
This occasion I don't know why they would
make a specific claim about it but she knows
that I have always given my medications on
the right time. (R. 87-88, lns. 25-11).
Despite these innuendoes the prosecution never
introduced any testimony or evidence whatsoever
in their support.
to the jury.

No evidence of bias was presented

It was error for trial counsel to fail

to object to this type of accusation at the time
it was made.

Although this does not constitute

reversible error on appeal, appellant should at
least be given the benefit of Mrs. Frkovich's
testimony on this appeal without diminishing it
with unproved innuendo asserted by the state.
It can be argued that Mrs. Frkovich's testimony
contains all the dangers inherent in the testimony
of the state's two eye-witnesses previously discussed.
This, however, is not true.

Although there is still

the problem of internal or external suggestion, there
is no problem concerning observation, lighting, anxiet
race-<lifferences, etc. surrounding identification of
the robbery suspect.

The only thing that was
-42-
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required of Mrs. Frkovich was to recall her activitiesi
during the crucial hour of the robbery.

This type

of recall is infinitely much easier than remembering
the description of another individual since the
former involves the witness's own activities while
the latter involves perception of an external object.
It might also be argued that it would be impossible
for Mrs. Frkovich to remember what she did on the
night of November 7, when the trial occurred 6 months
thereafter.

Normally, this would be a valid argument.

However, in this case she had reason to retrace
that night's activities one day after they had
occurred.

Q. Did that, the facttllat you learned
that Mr. Scott was subsequently arrested,
make you begin to think about the times
on November 7th?
A. Well, it kind of frightened me
because I didn't know what had gone wrong.
It did frighten me.

Q.

When you did find out about that
you became frightened? Did you think back
over the events of November 7th?

A.

Yes.

Q. And is it for that reason that you
can remember the specific time?
A.

That's right.
-43-

(R. 95, lns. 3-13).

!

Thus, Mrs. Frkovich needed to only recall the
events of one hour of time:

an hour marked with

enough significant events that she was able to
pinpoint to a few minutes the sequence which
occurred.

The prosecution was not able to change

this testimony.

And in spite of the unproven

prosecution innuendoes no reason existed for Mrs.
Frkovich to falsely relate the events of that
hour.

Furthermore, her probability of remembering

the time sequence was substantially greater than
either of the two state witnesses' probability
of accurate perception, retention, and recognition.
The testimony of Michael A. McDonald, a
rehabilitiation counsellor for the Office of
Rehabilitation Services, could only add more doubt
to the prosecution's case.

Mr. McDonald testified

that on November 6th when appellant was taken to
the Home, he "was wearing bell-bottomed blue denim
levis, beltless, with an avocado greenish turtleneck sweater with leather inserts." (R. 98, lns.
20-22).

He further testified that he had no

other clothing (R. 98).

After appellant had been

taken to the doctor on the 7th, Mr. McDonald

testified that he was still wearing the same outfit
of the previous day and still did not have any
additional clothing.

The testimony of Officer Peck

who made the arrest of appellant substantiated the
defense claim that appellant possessed no clothing
similar to that worn by the robber.

He also testi-

fied that the police found no weapon or money either
on appellant or in his room. (R. 112).

Nor had the

police been able to establish how appellant travelled
the approximate 3 miles round trip from the Home
to the robbery site and back to the Home (R. 115).
Officer Gocx:lrich's testimony added that the police
had also been unable to find any fingerprints at
the scene of the robbery (R. 79, lns. 15-18).
Reuel McPhie, administrator of the Bonneville
Convalescent Center, testified as to the strict
security measures that were employed at the Center
during the pericx:l in which appellant was confined.
He related the following procedure:
We have a little bit of an awkward
securing problem due to the fact we are
a split-level. We have two ground floors.
Ten minutes to eight the service door
which is on Tenth East side, a ground
f loor--ten minutes to eight the reception-it is a full service floor so there is no--

patients housed on that floor. Ten
minutes to eight the receptionist
announces the visiting hours will be
over in ten minutes and asks all visitors
to leave. At five minutes to eight she
announces that visiting hours will be
over at eight and asks all visitors to
leave at the parking lot entrance at
which time she pulls in the mats, checks
all of the offices and restrooms, lights;
make sure that the bars are locked on
the downstairs doors and the windows
are secured; locks the front door, goes
up and sets the listening devices on
second and first and goes herself out
the rear door on the first patient floor.
Shortly thereafter, according to how
patient visitors leave the area, but by
8:15 the nurses are instructed to see
to the securing of the other exit door.

. . . .

First floor is always secured by 8:00
o'clock and there is usually no problem
because that is when the girl is over
and clocks out. (R. 104)

Q. Do you have to unlock the door
or could anybody just push the door open,
let them in and then they come back inside?
A. No, it is a turn-lock.
Q. It is a turn lock?
A. It is a Corbine Double Safety Lock.
Unfortunately, demanded by F.H.A. Supposed
to be pick-proof. The hardware is about a
hundred dollars a door. It is one of the
financial burdens. (R. 106-07).
Throughout Mr. McPhie's testimony, the prosecution
attempted to discredit the security measures by
alluding to former patients who had walked away.
(see e.g. R. 109, lns. 1-4).

Again, however,

these allusions were unsupported by any evidence

intrcx:Iuced by the prosecution.

Although attempting

to show that a person might possibly be able to
penetrate the security of the Home, the prosecution
did not of fer any affirmative evidence indicating
that appellant had so done.

No evidence was intro-

duced showing that appellant was seen walking through
the doors or in their vicinity nor was any evidence
presented which indicated that the usual security
measures had not been followed on the night of the 7th
Finally, appellant testified that he had had a
previous felony conviction of grand larceny, that he
had gone to the Home to !!kick a narcotic habit,TT
(R. 119), that he had no other clothing except that
found when arrested, that he remembered the nurse
giving him the medicine, that he had never been in
the vicinity of the robbery before nor had he
committed the robbery, and that at the time of the
robbery his right arm was not injured. (R. 119-22).
Furthermore, he testified that at the time of the
robbery he had heavy sideburns and a beard. (R. 125).
CONCWSION
Appellant has shown that the evidence presented
by

the prosecution in this case was insufficient to

eliminate a reasonable doubt of innocence in the minds
-4. 7-

of reasonable men.

The fact that the jury found the

appellant guilty of the crime can only be explained
by examining the strong influence that eye witness
testimony has upon a jury:

evidence which appellant

has shown can be the most unreliable and inaccurate
type of evidence in many instances.
Appellant has shown that the testimony of Miss
Sorenson is unreliable because of her limited opportunity to observe the suspect, her inconsistency in
her testimony concerning what actually occurred
during the encounter, the normality of the situation
which gave her little reason to be observant except
at most for a few seconds at the end of her encounter,
her repeated subjection to photographs of the appellan
without an opportunity to identify him in person, and
finally the difficulty of identification when a
different race is involved.
Equally unreliable is the testimony of Mr.
Rosenberg who also had a very limited time of observation, was undergoing extreme anxiety at the time
of the encounter, was subjected to a questionable
lineup which accented appellant, and also suffered
the problem of identification of different races.
The testimony of these two witnesses was the only

evidence which the state introduced in an attempt

to prove the guilt of appellant.

Appellant suggests

that when there is no corroborating evidence in a
criminal case, the appellate court should be
careful to insure that a jury was not misled by its
high credence to eye-witness testimony.

Appellant

further respectfully suggests that when, as in this
case, there is overwhelming evidence showing the
innocence of a defendant, the appellate court should
reverse the jury verdict in the interest of justice.
Only in this way will the two foundations of our legal
system--innocent until proven guilty and guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt--retain their tremendous value
to all citizens.

This idea of preservation of these

safeguards has been eloquently stated by this Court
in a recent opinion:
In these days where the American public
cannot be condemned too much for concluding
that the criminal seemingly is the master
of his fate and captain of his soul, surrounded with some decisional safeguards
that sometimes drive prosecutors up the
wall, there are cases like this one, where
it is not so much a matter of polarizing
and protecting a criminalts so-called
unalienable rights, but one where the
judiciary must look to the safeguarding
of the traditional American system of
common, decent and reasonably fair treatment, to the effect that the common zeal
and the bundle of human rights fare more
conscionably if a guilty one might on
-49-

occasion where proof is lacking, go free
rather than gamble with the lives of those
who might be guiltless.
The jury system we think is the best
yet devised for free, fair justice. Sometimes, however, as does the finest mechanical
device, it may slow down, or stop or break
its mainspring. It is not infallible, and
hence lends substance and reason for this
courtrs existence and its obligation to
protect an individualrs freedom and other
rights against tyranny, unreasonable,
impetuous or legal irregularities of others,
including those indulged by juries that
wittingly or unwittingly depart from the
instructions or otherwise disregard the
invaluable presumption of innocence.
Utah v. George, No. 12135 (1971).
For the reasons enumerated above, appellant
respectfully requests that the lower courtrs
verdict of guilty be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

Ronald N. Boyce
College of Law
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
Attorney for Appellant
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